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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The United States Marine Corps is the world’s premier fighting force and has 
been in action against our Nation’s foes for over 200 years.  As successful as the 
Marines have been on the battlefield, the current planning process is in dire need 
of an overhaul if they are to maintain their combat superiority.   
 
The planning process is outdated and does not have the faith of the commanders 
and ground troops.  Faced with the myriad of changes on the modern battlefield, 
today’s military member is forced to rely solely on commander’s intent for 
guidance.  This is largely due to the inability of senior leadership to change the 
planning process, allowing it to adapt and keep up with the evolution of warfare.  
There is a considerable void left when planning is not accurate or missing critical 
elements and scenarios faced by our forces in contingency operations.   
 
This project will examine the current planning process and how it is implemented 
in the Marine Corps today.  Solutions will be developed and instituted into all 
levels of command, pending senior leadership approval.  The goal is to have 
significant changes made to the planning process in time for the upcoming 
deployment of Marine forces to Afghanistan.  Long term solutions will also be 
developed for approval and full implementation in all future contingency 
exercises and operations.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this project is to revitalize the Marine Corps planning process, 
which has been stagnant for over thirty years.  While changes have swept across 
the battlefield in the areas of weapons, technology, communication and armor, 
the system of military planning has remained the same.  The current planning 
process was developed to support a particular style of engagement, namely 
force-on-force.  However, the evolution of war has grown past those boundaries 
and removed the typical battlefield, replacing it with small towns, streets and 
homes filled with civilians.  The enemy has constantly made changes to their 
approach to warfare and tactics in order to survive against a superior force.  
Planning must now evolve to provide our ground troops with the best chance for 
success in any mission.   
 
The current planning process carries with it a fundamental paradox and the crux 
of this project.  Planners are still preparing for exercises, contingencies and 
operations with the mindset of force-on-force engagements.  Requirements are 
being assembled and sourced in the same manner that they were for WWII.  
There is training in current situations and updates to battle plans based on 
previous engagements, but the planning process has remained unchanged.  
There have been facelifts to the planning, but the structure beneath is the same.  
This forces Marines on the ground to adapt to each mission and overcome a lack 
of planning.  While “Adapt and Overcome” is our secondary motto, there are 
fundamental changes that need to be made in order to maintain our combat 
superiority throughout the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 
A Brief History of the United States Marine Corps 
 
 
The Early Days and Colonial Origins (1775 – 1798) 
 
The United States Marine Corps was originally organized as the Continental 
Marines and formed by the Continental Congress on 10 November, 1775.  At that 
time, the plan was to draw the new military personnel from among Washington’s 
army in Boston and send them to capture supplies from Halifax, Nova Scotia.  
However, Washington was unenthusiastic about the plan and suggested the 
Marines be recruited in New York or Philadelphia instead.   
 
On 28 November, 1775, Capt Samuel Nichols was commissioned as the 
Continental Marines’ first officer.  He is also known as the first commandant of 
the Marine Corps.  The official birthplace of the Marine Corps is Tun Tavern in 
Philadelphia, PA.  Young men that wandered into the local tavern were recruited 
for their first tour of duty.  Robert Mullen, the bartender, is listed as the first 
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official recruiter and later became a commissioned officer, serving in several 
operations over the next few years.   
 
The Continental Marines served with distinction through the end of the 
Revolutionary War in 1783.  At that time, there were 131 Colonial Marine officers 
and approximately 2,000 enlisted Colonial Marines.  The end of the Revolution 
was also the end of the Continental Marines and Navy, as both were disbanded. 
  
 
Founding the Modern Day Marine Corps (1798 – 1899) 
 
In preparation for a war with France, Congress created the United States Navy 
and Marine Corps.  President John Adams signed the act for establishing and 
organizing a Marine Corps on July 11, 1798.  This new Corps was to consist of a 
battalion of 500 privates, lead by a major and a compliment of officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs).  The intent behind establishing the Marines was 
to conduct ship-to-ship fighting, provide shipboard security and assist in landing 
forces.   
 
Several significant events took place during this time period: 
 
- The first official Commandant in the U.S. Marine Corps was Lieutenant 
Colonel Ward Burrows.  He was promoted to this office in June of 1800, 
when the capital moved to Washington D.C.  
 
- LtCol Burrows was given a stock of uniforms that were blue in color and 
had red trim.  This was the basis for the modern day “dress blues”.  
- LtCol Burrows also selected the land for the Marine Barracks between 8th, 
9th, G and I streets. These buildings are still service today and known as 
the 8th and I Marine Barracks.  
 
- The Marine band was founded and debuted at the President’s house on 
January 1, 1801.  It has garnered national acclaim and played for every 
presidential inauguration since.  
 
- Several significant engagements and actions took place, which laid the 
ground work to justify the Marine Corps’ existence.  They included: 
establishment of an advanced forward base, continued actions on ship, 
early amphibious landings and joint operations with the Navy and Army. 
  
- In 1834, the Marine Corps was in the fight for its life, pitting the President 
Andrew Jackson against the Commandant of the Marine Corps.  General 
Archibald Henderson had breathed new life into the Corps and took on 
many expeditionary duties.  President Jackson wanted to combine the 
Marine Corps with the Army.  However, Congress instead passed the Act 
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for the Better Organization of the Marine Corps, which stipulated that the 
Marine Corps was part of the Department of the Navy as a sister service.  
 
- The Civil War was not a highlight in our nation’s history or the Marine 
Corps’.  Half the strength of the Corps resigned to join the Confederacy.  It 
was during this war that the Marines had their only failed amphibious 
landing at Fort Sumter in Charlestown harbor.   
 
- During this time period, the Marines fought in battles and engagements in 
Panama, Asia, East India, Mexico, Chile, Columbia, Philippines, Cuba and 
the Caribbean.  For the most part, their performance was exemplary.   
 
- Under the Commandant Jacob Zeilin, Marine customs and courtesies 
began to take shape.  The Marine Corps adopted its emblem on 19 
November, 1868.  They also adopted new uniforms and the Marines 
Hymn.  In 1883, the motto Semper Fidelis, which translates to “always 
faithful”, became was first heard and has been with the Marine Corps ever 
since.   
 
 
Early 1900s 
 
During the early 1900s, the Marine Corps began to establish itself as a force in 
readiness, as demonstrated by landings at Guantanamo.   It was also becoming 
clear that the Marine Corps had significant advantages over the slow mobilization 
of the U.S. Army.  Between the years 1900 and 1916, the Marines continued 
worldwide operations and gained significant experiences in amphibious landings, 
counter insurgency and guerrilla tactics during the Banana Wars.   
World War I saw the Marines in a central role for the first time in a land battle.  
There were many battle tested veterans from previous engagements and they 
proved vital to the U.S. entry into the war.  The Marine Corps leadership did not 
rest on previous accolades, but instead kept abreast of the changing world 
situation and began preparing for future wars.  This new thought process marked 
a significant departure and ushered in a new age in military planning.  Many 
officers foresaw a war with Japan and began preparations for such a conflict.  
During the prelude to WWII, the Marine Corps pushed urgently for joint 
amphibious exercises and acquired equipment which would prove of great use in 
the upcoming conflict.   
 
World War II again saw the Marines in a key role.  The Marine Corps had been 
expanded from two brigades to two corps with six divisions and five air wings 
with 132 squadrons.  The battles and heroics during this engagement added to 
their already significant popular reputation.  By war’s end, the Corps had grown 
to a force of more than 485,000.  This war was also very costly, as the Marines 
lost 19,733 and 68,027 wounded.   
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Although the war had ended, the fight to remain a single force was just 
beginning.  The Army began pushing for a strengthened and reorganized 
defense establishment and wanted to fold the Marine mission into the Navy and 
Army.  Early Congressional support for this move did not look good for the 
Marines, but the leadership at the time rebuffed the dismantling and sought out 
new legislation.  The National Security Act of 1947 was adopted and instead of 
disbanding the Marine Corps, it gave statutory protection and further defined its 
mission.   
 
The National Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1952 and gave the Marine 
Corps an equal voice with the Joint Chiefs of Staff by appointing a Marine 
General.  It also established the current structure of three divisions and air wings, 
with the 3d Division being permanently based in the Far East (Okinawa).  The 
Act also defined the mission of the Marine Corps into seven key elements, further 
solidifying the Marine Corps as its own service.   
 
The Korean War again put the Marines in far off places fighting the enemy under 
austere conditions.  The Army found itself in a compromising position and had 
been overrun once before at the Pusan perimeter.  General McArthur called on 
the Marines to perform an amphibious landing at Inchon and provide a flanking 
maneuver.  The successful landing resulted in the collapse of the North Korean 
forces, but also saw the entrance of China into the war.  Chinese troops 
surrounded the American forces and the situation was grim.  Instead of 
surrendering or fleeing in disarray (as the Army had done previously), the 1st 
Marine Division regrouped and fought its way back to the coast, inflicting heavy 
casualties along the way.  The Battle of the Chosin Reservoir again showcased 
the resolve and toughness of the Marine Corps.   
 
The Vietnam War was the next battle fought by the Marines and pitted them in a 
land war with a tenacious enemy.  During this war, the Marines were conducting 
several different tactics that included constant guerrilla warfare, conventional war 
against NVA regulars and unconventional techniques for counterinsurgency 
warfare.  The end of the war and the years that followed were some of the lowest 
points in Marine history.  There were a high number of courts martial, non-judicial 
punishments, unauthorized absences and outright desertions.  This prompted 
what is now known as the remaking of the Marine Corps.  
 
In the 1970s many policies were changed and leadership styles shifted based on 
the dismal outlook for a peacetime force that did not know what to do with itself.  
This led to a cleansing of the worst Marines and an injection of better quality 
recruits.  The current leadership realized that having skilled officers was not 
enough, but that the NCO ranks were vital to a well disciplined and behaved 
force.  The transformation of the NCO Corps was an absolute vital element in the 
functioning of the Marine Corps and still is today. 
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It was during this era that the planning process was at its peak point.  All 
engagements were planned and executed using combined arms and battalion 
level maneuvers.  Planning was viewed as essential to success during large 
scale operations, even as planners conceived missions without knowledge of 
terrain or the benefit of extended weather forecast.  Towards the end of this 
period, it was apparent there was a shift in how planning was viewed as Marines 
on the ground began to lose faith in the ability of planners to accurately conceive 
a mission.   
 
 
New Face of the Enemy (1980 – Present) 
 
Up to this point, the world had seen many atrocities in large scale war and 
destruction.  America was no stranger to sending military to fight around the 
globe, even if the battle had not been on our own soil since the Civil War.  
However, a new enemy was beginning to surface that would change the way 
wars were fought forever.  
 
Terrorism was on the rise and random acts of violence were occurring around the 
world.  These terrorist groups knew they could not attack a military force head on 
in conventional tactics, but realized the power of terror, the media and political 
influence.  Operation Desert Storm was a prime example.  The feared Iraqi Army 
was known to the world as capable and relentless in their approach to warfare.  It 
only took a mere 43 days for the American forces to roll through the entire 
country and the world was shown just how inferior other Armies are.  This was a 
reality check for many of the forming terrorist organizations who realized they 
could not stand and fight.  
 
Guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency has become more popular throughout 
recent history, but force on force is still the main thrust to a war.  As terrorist 
attacks increased throughout the 80s and 90s, a fundamental shift in the forces 
to be engaged occurred.  Countries were no longer the enemy, but organizations 
inside the country that wanted to inflict terror for purposes of ideological or 
political gain.  This further complicated the issue.  
 
The last fifteen years has seen several engagements, most notably Iraq.  The 
lines between civilians and insurgent forces has been blurred and in most cases 
overrun.  The battlefield is no longer a field, but instead it is streets and houses.  
The enemy no longer wears a uniform and carries a gun, but instead fights with 
roadside bombs, cell phones and suicide bomber vests.  They do not hold to any 
rules or conventions and this allows a great deal of freedom when waging war 
against a superior foe.   
 
The Marine Corps has entered unfamiliar territory with the events of the last 20 
years.  It has been tasked with sustained operations that do not suit its 
expeditionary training and experience.  Typically, the Army has taken on the role 
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of sustainment and is well suited for that mission.  The Marine Corps is not 
designed, trained, equipped or suited to handle long term operations.  They are a 
light, mobile, expeditionary and amphibious force capable of projecting power 
from the sea and devastating attacks on land.  The events and current state of 
warfare has found the Marine Corps out of its element in many ways and 
struggling to adapt.  While the performance of the Marines indicates it can handle 
the mission, getting back to the amphibious roots is the first priority of the current 
leadership.     
 
During this period, the Marine Corps still utilized planning to a great extent and 
even made several efforts to resurrect the faith in the ability to plan with ground 
commanders.  However, a large disconnect had developed between the planners 
and the operators.  Some of this issue can be attributed to the decentralization of 
decision making and the ability of the ground commanders to improvise when 
necessary, keeping their commanders intent as the driving guidance.  Beyond 
that was the realization that planning was no longer leading exercises and 
contingency operations.  Instead, it had been reduced to sourcing logistical 
requirements and was now seen as out of touch with the evolution of warfare that 
had taken place.   
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Literature Review 
 
 
MCWP5-1:  The Marine Corps War Fighting Publication 5-1 is the document that 
outlines the planning process and is used by commanders to support decision 
making.  This is the “bible” of planning and is billed as flexible and 
interchangeable at all command levels.  This publication was consulted for an 
overview of the current planning process and used for reference when dealing 
with planning procedures. 
   
 
Command & Staff College, Non-Resident:  The Command & Staff non-resident 
course is designed for Lieutenant Colonels as their resident Primary Military 
Education (PME) requirement for promotion.  It is also considered middle level 
schools for field grade officers.  The course can be taken as a resident status in a 
one year school or as non-resident either through correspondence or through 
lectures at command locations.  Course materials cover the planning aspects of 
the operational level of war, as well as the tactical level.  For the purposes of this 
project, the program course materials were used as reference to ensure accurate 
descriptions and procedures of the current planning process were depicted.  
      
 
SharePoint NIPR and SIPR:  SharePoint is the newest revolution in web-based 
connectivity for all commands.  Each command has their own website where all 
aspects of daily routine and mission planning are stored and can be accessed by 
registered users.  There are two versions of the website, a commercial side 
(NIPR) and a secret, secure version (SIPR).  Both the NIPR and SIPR are only 
accessible through government computers with a CAC card (ID card with a 
computer chip) reader.   
 
SharePoint is utilized by planners to bridge the distance and time gaps, as well 
as communication for all mission requirements.  For the purposes of this project, 
SharePoint was a source of information for past operations and as a learning 
guide for how planning was conducted previously.   
 
 
Planning Conferences:  Conferences are being included in the literature review 
because they were relevant communications for this project and upcoming 
exercises/operations.  Planning conferences are utilized by planners when 
exercises/operations will be conducted with joint services, multi-national forces 
and/or in remote locations.  Several conferences were attended in preparation for 
upcoming exercises and operations: 
 
- Cobra Gold 08 (Thailand): Initial Planning Conference (IPC)  Nov 07, 
Middle Planning Conference (MPC) Jan 08, Final Planning Conference 
(FPC) Mar 08.  
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- Talon Vision 09 (Philippines): IPC June 08, FPC Aug 08. 
 
- Balikitan 09 (Philippines): IPC Oct 08 
 
- Talisman Saber 09 (Australia): IPC July 08, MPC Nov 08, FPC Mar 09. 
 
- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF Afghanistan): IPC/FPC Oct 08. 
 
During these conferences, lead planners from all aspects of the operation are 
present and work together in preparation for the mission.  This was a 
considerable source of information and education.   
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Research Procedure 
 
 
Much like the humble beginnings of the Marine Corps, this project was first 
conceived in a bar.  During the Cobra Gold 08 final planning conference, a 
conversation was started with a senior leader that was in attendance for the 
purpose of evaluating the conference.  Several liaison officers had questions 
about the process and how it applied to operations.  They were new to the 
planning construct, but each had extensive operational experience.  Throughout 
the remainder of the evening, the glaring reality that planning was not in line with 
current operations became the focal point of the growing audience.  One week 
later, the liaison officers found themselves in the middle of an unorthodox project.  
It was unorthodox because senior leadership wanted Marines from outside the 
planning process to evaluate, recommend and implement changes. 
 
After assembling the team, the project timeline was established.  The goal was to 
have an operational product implemented in time for the upcoming Afghanistan 
deployment in December of 2008.  The flow of the project was setup to fully 
integrate into current operational contingencies.  The main idea was to evaluate 
the Marine Corps planning machine while it was in motion.  The team would be 
spread out across current operations and planning exercises.  The above was 
agreed upon, with changes requiring approval from the III Marine Expeditionary 
Force (MEF) commander and is shown below in figure 1. 
 
The research procedures used during this project were based on several key 
factors: 
 
- Understanding the current planning process and how it is implemented 
 
- Identifying contributing elements of the planning process 
 
- Identifying problem areas within the main construct of operational planning 
 
- Development of solutions to the problems identified 
 
- Implementation of the solutions   
 
 
  
 
* = JTF: Joint Task Force 
 
Figure1: Phased implementation of project schedule 
 
 
The project timeline and milestones were also developed and approved through 
senior leadership.  They are shown in detail in Figure 2 below.  From the start, 
this project was an ambitious undertaking.  In the beginning, there was significant 
discussion on the feasibility of obtaining realistic results under such a time 
compressed schedule.  After all, the Marine Corps planning process has been in 
place for a significant amount of time and battle tested through many of the 
largest battles and wars this world has seen.  Was it conceivable to think that 
significant impact could be made and implemented in less than a year? 
 
The answer was a resounding yes.  The team and leadership believed the work 
could be accomplished with proper planning and due diligence on the part of the 
team members.  The real question was would senior leadership accept the 
recommendations and fully implement change throughout the Marine Corps.  
Prior to work beginning on the project a senior leadership conference was held 
and it was agreed that if the team could produce viable COAs and a realistic 
implementation schedule then they had the backing of every senior officer up the 
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.   
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Project Schedule and Milestones 
Action Event Milestone 
Achieved 
Approved/Date 
Briefed 
Research CG 08 Yes Apr 08 
Develop COAs TS 09 IPC Yes July 08 
Revise COAs TV 09 FPC Yes Aug 08 
Implement Short 
term COAs 
Balikitan IPC/TV 
09 
Yes Oct 08 
Deploy Short 
Term COAs 
OEF Afghanistan On Schedule Nov 08 
Develop Long 
Term COAs 
Talisman Saber 
09 
On Schedule Apr 09 
 
Implement Long 
Term COAs 
Talisman Saber 
09 
On Schedule June 09 
  
Figure 2:  Project Schedule and Milestones 
 
The first phase of the project was research.  It was imperative that the personnel 
developing the changes to the planning process fully understand the system they 
were affecting.  The main focus of this phase was to review Marine Corps 
doctrine and how the planning process supported successful missions.  This was 
accomplished by reviewing MCWP 5-1 and planning documents from past 
exercises and contingency operations from the past eight years.   
 
It was also important to understand how elements of the planning process were 
executed and their role in the larger picture of the battlefield.  To facilitate this 
understanding, team members played active roles in all planning conferences 
and Operational Planning Team (OPT) sessions.  During these conferences and 
meeting, senior commanders of the groups were made available for interviews 
and discussions on potential changes and impacts of those changes.  Research 
is an ongoing aspect of this project and is still taking place today. 
 
Identifying the problems with the current planning process was the next phase of 
the project.  Determining the focal point of the problems became a complicated 
issue due to the nature of the commands involved and their operational missions.  
The process of identifying problems was broken down into two functional areas, 
observation and analysis.  They are explained further below:  
 
Observation: 
 
The observation phase was further broken down into three sections: operational 
planning at the unit level, OPTs and planning conferences.  Due to time 
constraints and operational necessity, this phase was trimmed down from six 
months to four.  This was initially a concern.  After reviewing the timeline, the 
team recommended cutting the time on the observation phase to be able to 
increase the amount of time available on the solutions and implementation 
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phases.  This was approved by the senior leadership at III MEF and Marine 
Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC).   
 
During the observation phase, the following actions were completed: 
 
- Operational planning at the unit level:  All operational meetings, briefs, 
situation updates, battle update assessments and commanders in calls 
were attended.  This included the four levels of command, MARFORPAC, 
III MEF, 3d Marine Logistics Group (3d MLG) and Combat Logistics 
Regiment 37 (CLR-37).  Particular attention was paid to content, 
processes, command relationships and progress.  Commanders were also 
interviewed for their thoughts, perceptions and experiences throughout the 
planning process.   
 
- OPTs:  Several OPTs were attended during the observation phase.  
During this time period, there were OPTs convened only at the high three 
levels of command and not at CLR-37.  This is typical because the CLR is 
a subordinate element of the MLG.  The focus of observation was on 
specific representation and input provided.  
 
- Planning Conferences:  All conferences were attended by a member of 
the observation team.  These included:  ISS/IPC, MPC and FSS/FPC for 
Foal Eagle 08, Key Resolve 08, Cobra Gold 08, Talon Vision 09 and 
Balikitan 09.  The observation team acted as working members and 
tracked attendance, participation, input provided (based on a 1 – 5 scale) 
and conducted interviews with the officer in charge of the conference.     
 
All information compiled during the observation phase was consolidated and 
prepared for the next step, analysis. 
 
 
Analysis: 
 
The first step in the analysis phase was to separate all the information into the 
three functional areas being studied:  operational planning at the unit level, OPTs 
and planning conferences.  Once that was accomplished, the information was 
cleansed or purified to ensure that random occurrences or perceptions were not 
leading the analyst to form conclusions that were baseless.   
 
The act of cleansing the information is basically a roundtable meeting with the 
commanders of the units and the observation team.  All the members present for 
this meeting bring a wide variety of experience.  Due to the high volume of 
movement in the military, many of the members had served at other operational 
commands and were able to confirm the observations as presenting a true 
picture of what was taking place during the planning process.   
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The next stage was to validate the information.  This was accomplished by 
coordinating with the main operational commands in the Marine Corps (I MEF, II 
MEF, Pacific Command (PACOM) and HQMC.  All commands were provided the 
same information that was presented during the cleansing process and asked to 
review it for accuracy as compared to procedures and routines in their respective 
commands.  The hope was that the validation stage would return at least 75% 
compliance from all involved.    Surprisingly, 90% of all information sent out came 
back as validated and substantiated across the Marine Corps.  This was very 
encouraging on several fronts.  It meant that the planning process was similar at 
the major commands and that the results of an overhaul to the process would 
most likely be more accepted and long lasting.  This is due to the fact that major 
commands would not have to make massive changes because they were already 
operating with the 70% solution just like every other command. 
 
 
Once the research and analysis was complete, the next phase was to develop 
Courses of Action (COA).  These COAs were split into two categories, short term 
and long term.  The short term COAs were identified as changes that could be 
made quickly at the lower command levels and would have a measurable impact.  
The long term COAs were broad sweeping changes that required time and 
HQMC assistance in order to implement.  The COAs then fell into a continuous 
cycle of development, review and submission to higher authority.  As the COAs 
were reviewed, they were accepted, rejected or sent back with follow on 
guidance.  This process has been ongoing throughout the project.     
 
Throughout each phase of the project, interviews were conducted, meetings and 
conferences attended, extensive email correspondence utilized and operational 
experience was relied upon as a basis for comparison to current procedures. 
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RESULTS 
 
 
There was little doubt that the Marine Corps planning process still held a vital role 
in today’s military operations.  There was also no disagreement in the fact that 
current planning procedures and outputs are not providing the ground 
commanders with the best COAs.  It was imperative to this project that there was 
a thorough understanding of the planning process before attempting to 
recommend solutions that would change the course of military history.   
 
 
The Current Planning Process 
 
The Marine Corps War Fighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1 defines the planning 
process.  It is the bible, if you will, and describes a planning process that 
supports decision making by the commander.  The purpose of the planning 
process is to provide a vehicle that conveys a commander’s decisions to his 
subordinates.  It is also applicable to all echelons of commands and across all 
ranges of military operations. 
 
The latest revisions to the planning process were completed and published in 
2001.  Prior to that, major revisions had not been accomplished since May of 
1979.  This is not due to neglect or oversight, but more out of operational tempo 
and leadership indecision on where the processes needed to point.  Since 2001, 
events have changed how the Marine Corps views each operation.  The latest 
changes to the planning process were designed to provide different commands 
with the ability to adapt the processes to their individual needs.  It is also 
provides tools to assist in planning, such as matrices, worksheets and formats.  
While the processes described are designed for higher echelon implementation, 
there is also the ability to adapt the planning to be easily scalable for lower level 
use at the battalion or group levels.   
 
Planning defined is “the act of envisioning and determining effective ways of 
achieving a desired endstate.”  The Marine Corps takes that definition a step 
further and it becomes, “Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time 
and space to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to 
events as they occur.  This means contemplating and evaluating potential 
decisions in advance.”  Planning is an essential and significant part of command 
and control and the commander is recognized as the central decision maker. 
 
The Marine Corps focuses its planning on the mission and the threat.  It 
capitalizes on the principle of unity of effort and supports the establishment and 
maintenance of tempo.  Above all else, the considerations of time and 
uncertainty dictate the approach to planning and are the defining features.  Time 
is the scarcest of resources and it is vitally important that commanders and staff 
optimize their processes to best utilize this dwindling asset.  When time is critical, 
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planners use intuition, experience and judgment to guide them.  All planners 
must also be aware that no amount of planning will remove uncertainty.  Time 
and uncertainty are intertwined and have a great affect on one another.  Planning 
is future oriented and the future is full of uncertainty.  All planning is based on 
imperfect knowledge and assumptions.  Even in the midst of extreme uncertainty, 
proper planning allows the commanders to decide and act effectively.  The key 
functions of planning are to: 
 
- Direct and coordinate actions 
 
- Develop a shared situational awareness 
 
- Generate expectations about how actions will evolve and how they will 
affect the desired outcome.   
 
- Support the exercise of initiative. 
 
- Shape the thinking of planners. 
 
These key functions are then used as a basis for the tenets of the planning 
process.  The tenets are derived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare and they 
guide the commander’s use of his staff to plan and execute military operations.  
The three tenets are top down planning, single battle concept and integrated 
planning.  All three are outlined in detail below.   
 
Top down planning:  The commander is the key to this process and must drive 
the concept with his intent and guidance.  Because planning is one of the 
fundamental responsibilities of command, the commander must do more than 
merely participate.  Planning is used to provide the commander with knowledge 
of a situation to support his decision making process, as well as to provide 
subordinates with a concept of operations that will be used in accomplishing the 
mission.  It is imperative that the commander not only provide input during this 
process, but also keep his staff engaged to ensure the planning meets his intent 
and has the best chance at mission accomplishment.  
 
Single battle concept:  The commander must be able to effectively visualize 
and focus all the elements of a force to accomplish the mission.  During an 
operation, one part of the battlefield may have profound and often unintended 
effects on others areas and events.  This means the commander must view the 
battlespace as an indivisible entity.  The staff planners may and often do 
conceptually divide the battle into sections such as deep, close and rear to assist 
and decentralize execution.  When viewing and fighting a single battle, the 
commander’s intent is more likely to be accomplished and ensure a unity of 
effort.   
 
Integrated planning:  Integrated planning is based on the war fighting functions 
of command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics and force 
protection.  These are the building blocks of a successful operation and planners 
use them to integrate the planning effort and supervise the execution of the plan.  
The commander uses integrated planning as a disciplined approach that is 
systematic, coordinated and thorough.   The key element to this approach is the 
assignment of appropriate personnel to represent each specific war fighting 
function.   
 
The tenets described above provide the basis for the commander and his staff to 
begin the planning process.   The first step is to follow procedures that are 
established and designed to analyze a mission, develop COAs and translate the 
operational order to subordinates for execution.  These procedures are broken 
down into six manageable and logical steps.  Each step provides the planners at 
all levels with a means to organize activities, transmit plans to subordinate levels 
and subordinates and to share a common understanding of the mission and the 
commander’s intent.  The planning steps encourage interaction which allows a 
coordinated effort that maintains flexibility, effectively uses time and ensures 
information sharing.  Figure 3 below is a graphical representation of the six steps 
in the planning process. 
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Figure 3:  Six Steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process 
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Mission Analysis:  The first step in the planning process.  The purpose is to 
review and analyze orders from higher headquarters and to produce a mission 
statement.   
 
Course of Action Development:  Planners use the mission statement to 
develop COAs that are suitable, acceptable and complete in accordance with the 
commander’s intent and facilitate mission accomplishment.  
 
Course of Action War Game:  This step involves detailed assessment of each 
COA as it pertains to the enemy and the battle space.  Each friendly COA is war 
gamed against an enemy COA to determine strengths, weaknesses, associated 
risks and associated shortfalls.  War gaming provides the most reliable basis for 
understanding and improving each COA.  
 
Course of Action Comparison and Decision:  The commander selects the 
COA that will best accomplish the mission by evaluating each COA against 
established procedures.   
 
Orders Development:  The staff uses the commander’s COA decision and 
intent to develop orders that direct unit actions.     
 
Transition:  The passing of the orders to those directed to execute the task.  It is 
an orderly process that provides that tasked with situational awareness and 
rational for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a clear and coherent shift 
from planning to execution.  
 
Once the transition has occurred, there is a distinctive break between planners 
and commanders that are executing the mission.  The operational planners are 
typically assigned to a new project, extension of the mission or another mission 
altogether.  The operational commanders execute the plan at their discretion, as 
long as they are following the commander’s intent.  Often times in contingency 
operations it is found that while the planning was invaluable in creating situational 
awareness and conveying the commander’s intent, the actual plan is not worth 
the paper it is printed on.  Several contributing factors are the cause of this and 
will be discussed in detail later.  
 
 
 
How the Planning Process is Implemented 
 
 
Now that we have discussed what the planning process looks like, it is important 
to understand how it is implemented across the Marine Corps.  The intent of the 
planning system is to have the same consistency at all commands.  A 
commander, in theory, should be able to move to any command and be able to 
engage his planning staff without any questions or changes to procedures and 
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team composition.  For the most part, this has been accomplished.  While the 
size of the planning staff will change based on each unique mission, the 
procedures, processes and outputs of the planning process remain unchanged at 
various commands throughout the Marine Corps.  
 
The burden of operational planning is placed squarely on the shoulders of the G3 
section of each command.  For clarification, the “G” sections are as follows, G1 – 
Admin, G2 – Intel, G3 – Operations, G4 – Logistics, G6 – Communications, G8 – 
Finance.  The staffing of the G3 is made up of several senior enlisted and officers 
that represent Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) critical to the planning 
process.  Each MOS representative is considered to be a Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) in his/her field and represents that specialty in all aspects of operational 
planning.   
 
Several key MOSs that are generic to every planning staff.  They are the Air 
officer (AirO), Logistics officer (LogO), Communications officer (CommO), Intel 
officer and the Chief of Staff (CoS).  The CoS is responsible for the planning staff 
as well as the principal and special staff to the commander.  During the planning 
process, elements of the principal or special staff will meet with the planning staff 
to provide input into the process as needed. 
 
There are three main actors or elements responsible for the development of an 
operational plan.  They are the operational planner, Operational Planning Team 
(OPT) and the planning conference.  The planning conferences are known as 
Initial Planning Conference (IPC), Middle Planning Conference (MPC) and the 
Final Planning Conference (FPC).  There are also multiple spin off conferences 
dedicated to logistics, manpower, deployment and redeployment which are used 
to plan for a specific function, but will not be discussed.  
 
   
Operational Planner: 
 
The operational planner is assigned to the G3 operations section as needed, 
requested or directed.  This billet is a collateral duty and is not considered to be 
time spent in the respective MOS.  Operational planning at the command level 
carries with it a certain negative stigma, while planning at the joint level comes 
with an air of prestige.  The problems associated with this will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
Operational planning is a grueling assignment that brings little reward.  The 
planner never sees an operation through to completion because they are moved 
to another assignment as soon as the execution phase begins.  During the 
execution phase, the planners are the source of everything that can and will go 
wrong.  However, a good planner is sought after and rarely allowed out of the 
sight of the commander.   
 
Operational Planning Team (OPT) 
 
Once a requirement is identified, an OPT is built from internal and, as required, 
external units.  A task organized team with supporting units is built around 
analysts, SMEs and any other military specialties required by the mission.  These 
teams are led by the commander and his staff.    
 
The OPT is a critical asset to the commander when a task or mission is received 
from higher headquarters.  The OPT is convened for exercises, missions and 
contingency operations when there is time to do so.  The OPT is an integration 
tool that provides the commander with COAs.  It is at the heart of all units within 
a command and gathers, consolidates and optimizes their input before creating 
operational orders for the commander.   
 
The composition of the OPT is shown graphically below in Figure 4: (The 
operational planners are part of the G3 section and make up the bulk of the 
planning team) 
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Figure 4:  OPT Composition 
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Liaison officers are used to represent each command or Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) component that will be utilized during the execution of the 
operational plan.  Typically, they originate from the Major Logistics Command 
(MLC), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), the Air Combat Element (ACE) and 
any coalition allies for joint and multinational operations.     
 
It is important to note that in today’s modern and mechanized world, there cannot 
be enough emphasis placed on logistical planning.  Nothing stops an operation 
from moving forward faster than not having enough gas or a resupply of 
ammunition.  While logistics plays a major role in any operation, there are many 
other factors to consider.  They are shown graphically in figure 5 below: 
 
 
 
MSTP
Fires
C2 
Intel
Force
Protection
Maneuver
Logistics
Functions that a commander 
and his staff must consider /  
coordinate when planning       
operations.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
CSSE capabilities 
and limitations.
Infrastructure, roads, 
ports, airfields, beaches, 
threats to CSS forces, etc.
Monitor, direct, execute and 
coordinate logistics and maintain 
comm with Higher, Adjacent, & 
Supported logistic operators.
CSS task organization and positioning 
of critical supplies that enables fires to be 
brought to bear against the enemy.
CSS task organization and unit positioning that 
enables movement of forces for the purpose of 
gaining an advantage over the enemy.
Measures taken to protect our 
logistics assets from enemy activities 
and natural occurrences.
CSSE = Combat Service Support Element 
CSS = Combat Service Support 
C2 = Command and Control 
 
Figure 5: Planning Considerations for War Fighting Functions 
 
 
Planning Conferences 
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Planning conferences are another tool that the commander has at his discretion.  
They are most useful when planning operations and exercises with joint and 
multinational forces.  Typically, the conferences are held on location for exercises 
or at higher headquarters for contingency operations.   
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There are key factors to consider when holding planning conferences: 
 
- Cost:  III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) is one of the largest users 
of the planning conferences.  They are responsible for yearly exercises in 
the Philippines, Thailand, Korea and Australia.  A typical planning 
conference consists of anywhere from 25 – 100 planners, which includes 
host nation support and all unit representatives for the exercises.  Cost is 
a critical factor when considering the number of participants, location and 
length of stay.  Typically, there is an Initial Site Survey (ISS) and Final Site 
Survey (FSS) that are held in conjunction with the IPCs and FPCs.  Each 
evolution lasts approximately a week.  Normal costs for all exercise 
planning conferences can easily exceed $750K.    
 
- Key personnel:  Having the right personnel on hand is imperative to any 
position, but even more so when engaged in the planning phase of a 
major operation.  The intent is that each representative present at the 
conference is empowered with the ability to make decisions for their 
respective unit, MOS and commander for the purposes of that exercise.  
Specifically for exercises, the purposes of the conference is to work out 
show stopping details and critical requirements with the host nation face to 
face and solidify over arching constructs prior to the end of the 
conference.   
 
- Site Surveys:  Being able to see the ground that a unit will be operating 
on, talk with the vendors that will be providing support, check the local 
water and food sources for health issues, view the training areas, landing 
zones and ports are all invaluable pieces of information in the planning 
process.  Obviously, in contingency operations, this will most likely not be 
available unless the military has operated in the region previously.  
However, for exercises, this greatly enhances every unit’s ability to come 
prepared to accomplish their given mission.   
 
Planning conferences have been considered what we call a boondoggle 
(vacation or time to party away from their main duty station).  However, recently, 
the past two commandants have refocused our planning process and placed 
restrictions on the number of attendees, locations and length of stay.  While the 
planning conferences have proven to be very beneficial, there is also the 
potential for them to be a large waste of time if not kept focused and under 
control.   
 
Having conducted all the research and developed solutions, command approval 
is the next step in making changes to the planning process.  Issues or proposed 
changes to procedures that affect the entire Marine Corps must be vetted 
through local commands before being submitted through senior leadership 
channels at HQMC.  Figure 6 below outlines the command levels, dates briefed 
and approved.  
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Command Approval Hierarchy 
Command First 
Presented 
Date Briefed Date 
Approved 
Submitted to 
Higher 
3d MLG OEF OPT 15 July 18 July 18 July 
III MEF TS09 IPC 21 July 23 July 23 July 
MARFORPAC TV09 FPC 12 Aug 30 Sep 30 Sep* 
MARFORLANT** Balikitan IPC 15 Oct 17 Oct 17 Oct 
HQMC OEF OPT 23 Oct 25 Oct -- 
* = Sent to HQMC for cursory review, official decision pending MARFORLANT 
approval 
** = Via VTC (video television conference) 
 
Figure 6:  Command Approval Hierarchy 
 
During the command approval process, several briefs were given to different 
levels of leadership.  These briefs gave an overview of the current planning 
process, observations, analysis and solutions to the problems identified.  
 
For the purposes of this project, the following areas were identified as 
problematic and in need of change.   
 
- Force on Force:  Long gone are the days of meeting on a battlefield at 
noon and charging across the open field.  The development of gunpowder 
put an end to that type of battlefield planning.  It should also be 
understood that there is not an Army in the world that could attack the 
U.S. military with force on force and have a chance.  This is due to several 
factors that include:  money spent on defense (the U.S. spends more than 
its next five closest competitors combined), equipment and training.   
 
The fundamental flaw during contingency planning is the idea of planning 
for force-on-force.  The Marine Corps has been a leader in developing 
small unit tactics and training in a scenario based environment, but plans 
are still being drawn up with battalion and regiment size operations.  This 
type of fighting has served us well in many of our past engagements, but 
as the face of warfare changes forever, so must we adapt.  The enemy 
has learned that guerrilla and counterinsurgency style tactics are the only 
way to be successful against a superior force.  
 
The focus must be on platoon and small unit operations.  The Marine 
Corps is the only military force in the world that can coordinate naval 
gunfire and close air support with one Marine on the ground that is 
engaged in the fight.  The technology to continue and further this type of 
mission execution is the future of our military.   
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- Key Personnel:  Critical!  SMEs should be exactly that, a no kidding 
expert in their field that can speak to command issues during an evolution 
and assist the planners with a way around complications.  Far too often 
the SMEs that attend OPTs or conferences are the guy from the shop that 
can’t be trusted with anything.  The justification is that the real SMEs are 
busy executing the daily mission, already deployed or preparing for the 
next deployment and that the planning process rarely produces a quality 
product.  There is some truth and concern over the high operational tempo 
being faced by all military forces, but not putting our best effort forward 
during the planning phase only reinforces the fact that all we are going to 
get out of it is garbage.  There are other factors that tie into why key 
personnel are not utilized during planning and they are listed below.  
 
- Perceptions of Operational Planners:  “Those that can, do, those that 
can’t, plan.”  This is a quote from a unit commander of an infantry battalion 
in the Army.  It embodies the mentality of many of the infantry personnel in 
the Army and the Marine Corps.  The basis behind this is years of 
planning that are not up to the quality that is expected.   This is due to 
several factors: 
 
o Career paths:  As previously discussed, operational planners are 
operating outside of their respective MOS.  In order to stay in line 
for promotion and career advancement, there are generally 
accepted accomplishments or wickets that must be met.  
  MOS credibility: time spent in the MOS executing your 
primary mission 
 B-Billet:  Independent duty outside the MOS such as a 
recruiter, drill instructor, etc… 
 Command time:  Commanding officer or executive officer of 
a company, regiment, group or higher 
 Joint billet:  Serving at a joint command or with a joint staff in 
a deployed environment.   
 
Notice that no where listed above is the billet for operational 
planner.  Becoming an operational planner is often times viewed as 
a kiss of death career wise and to be avoided if at all possible.  It is 
also seen as a thankless staff job that is merely to be survived, 
enduring endless hours through nights and weekends developing 
plans that may or may not be utilized by the units that execute the 
mission.   
 
- Change in Force Structure:  In the mid 1990s, the Marine Corps began 
to realize that it needed a more focused effort in the planning arena.  One 
solution was to open up an MOS that was specifically called operational 
planner.  The intent was to have a trained force of personnel that planned 
for a living.  This idea stopped short of creating an officer MOS, as it was 
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only opened up to the enlisted side.  Prior to this move, all planners were 
sourced from internal units.  A temporary reprieve was seen at the unit 
level as Marines laterally moved into the MOS, but this was short lived.  
The MOS topped out with senior enlisted quickly and lost the allure of 
faster than normal upward mobility.  The elation over qualified operational 
planners lost ground quickly when many were discovered to be improperly 
screened and not qualified for the assignment.  The end result was that 
once again units began sourcing quotas for planning billets and reverted 
to sending their least qualified personnel, because they couldn’t justify 
parting with their top performers.   
  
- Planning is lacking key functional areas:  While planning is being 
conducted at a fast and furious level all around the Marine Corps, the end 
product is far too often not in line with the situations that are being faced 
by the units executing the mission.  This is due, in part, to the fact that as 
warfare has moved from the open country side to city streets and urban 
areas, there have been no adjustments in planning. 
 
All aspects of conducting combat operations are affected by the terrain, 
location, weather and more specifically, the proximity to civilian population.  
Civilian Military Operations (CMO) and the Civil Affairs Group (CAG) have 
quickly become an integral part of the force composition in recent years.  
Marine war fighters engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan are finding that more 
and more of their time is being consumed with civil affairs issues.  In a 
populous world, fighting terrorist organizations with a puppet government 
in place, this situation will be played out over battlefields for years to 
come.   
 
CMOs have been in place in the military throughout many of our nations 
past battles.  However, Iraq has been the showcase for these types of 
operations and is considered to be the first concerted efforts made in this 
area.  General Mattis was a true architect of these projects for the Marine 
Corps and made it a part of his “winning the hearts and minds of the 
people” motto in 2003 when Iraq was invaded.  CMOs are controlled by 
civil affair units.  
 
Civil affair units are designed to act as a liaison between the civilian 
inhabitants of a warzone or disaster area and the military presence, both 
informing the local commander of the status of the civilian populace as 
well as effecting assistance to locals.  They are composed primarily of 
civilian experts (doctors, lawyers, engineers, fireman, policeman, etc…) 
that provide critical expertise to host government support and are able to 
assess the need for critical infrastructure projects.   
 
Civil affairs and CMO planning is typically far outside the mission of the 
Marine Corps.  However, in 2006, the Marine Corps realigned its force 
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structure to create a civilian affairs MOS.  Prior to this move, all civil affairs 
were handled by the Army and Army Reserve.  Marines in Iraq were 
placed in charge of CMOs and Civilian Military Operations Centers 
(CMOCs), without any requisite training.  While they handled the missions 
successfully, it was painfully clear that if the Marine Corps were to 
continue missions of this nature, drastic changes needed to be made.  
The first was to create the new MOS; the next step will be to implement 
this new structure into training, exercises and contingency operations.  To 
date, planning for CMOs is not present in any exercise planning.  
 
Closely tied to civil affairs and equally as important are financial 
operations.  Afghanistan and Iraq have been the first battlefields where 
cash was moved forward with the operating forces and used to make 
battle damage, solatia and even death payments.  The structure behind 
what is required for cash operations is not well understood by senior 
leadership and the regulations are foreign to commanders on the ground.  
Units are not aware of what money is available, its designate purposes or 
how to access it.  These types of operations are also not represented 
during the planning process.     
 
- Planning Conferences:  Planning conferences were looked at closely to 
determine their feasibility, composition and outputs.  Once the project was 
defined and tasked, several previous conferences were reviewed to 
determine agendas and accomplishments.  In conjunction with current 
conferences, this was used as a baseline and combined with 
commander’s interviews to paint a better picture of what the conference 
provided to all levels of command and the particular exercise.  
 
Conferences have increased due to the value of increasing diplomatic ties 
and planning at the location of an exercise.  However, the cost of these 
conferences has ballooned due to little oversight on attendees and 
virtually no control over agenda or requirements.  One of the main issues 
is that there is not one clear commander of the conferences with authority 
over the participants.  There has been funding in recent years that could 
be applied for the conferences, but reality is that is won’t be there in 
upcoming years.  Planning conferences may have certain intrinsic 
benefits, but alternative avenues of accomplishing the same mission must 
be sought out and available for future operations.    
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
After identifying the main issues with the current planning process, work began 
on solutions and the procedures to implement them into the current structure.    
As mentioned previously, the intent for this project was to have it designed, 
approved and released to the operational forces in time for the upcoming 
Afghanistan deployment and full implementation for the Talisman Saber 09 
exercise (June 09).  
  
 
Force on force planning 
 
Solution:  The Marine Corps doctrine is based on maneuver warfare conducted 
by a MAGTF, resulting in force projection in ship to shore operations.  Recent 
operations, world events and changes in warfare have led to the conclusion that 
a fundamental shift in strategy may be required to keep a tactical advantage over 
our nation’s foes.   
 
Although not discussed in this paper, the Marine Corps theory of war is derived 
from the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical.  The team that 
was comprised to study the planning process, make recommendations and 
implement changes for MARFORPAC was operating at the tactical and 
operational level.  The recommendations for an update to strategic planning are: 
 
- Continue funding for small unit level tactics in the operational forces. 
 
- Increase funding for the instruction of small unit training during the 
accession pipeline (initial training before arriving at an operational unit). 
 
- After discussing options with commanders and operational planners, a 
formal request was sent through HQMC to recommend that the top level 
schools of warfare and the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) conduct 
more research into the possibility for a doctrinal change to the Marine 
Corps operational strategy.  Findings were requested prior to the FY2011 
budget execution year.   
 
On October 30, 2008, HQMC approved the request for further research and will 
forward it on to the designated agencies.  Given the timetable allocated, 
operational tempo and rotation schedules for all Marines, it is unlikely that there 
will be an answer to this question while any of the existing personnel are still at 
this location.  While the team assigned to this project was looking forward to 
being on the cusp of a historical change for the Marine Corps, they all agreed 
that a change of this magnitude needed further confirmation and would better 
serve and defend the American people if it was implemented slowly. 
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Key Personnel, Perceptions and Structure 
 
Solution:  This was considered to be one of the critical elements identified 
during this process.  Planning is an essential part of mission success and the 
lives of our young Marines are hanging in the balance when worldwide 
contingencies flare up.   
 
Extensive coordination was conducted with the manpower branch at HQMC and 
senior leadership to develop a plan to correct the errors of the past in this area.  
The following recommendations were presented: 
 
- A new planning MOS will be launched in FY2010 for both officer and 
enlisted. 
 
- Current operational planners will be offered the opportunity to lateral move 
into that MOS as early as May 2009, before the current rotations of 
movers take place.  Lateral move packages must be approved by the local 
command and forwarded to HQMC with endorsements from all 
commanding officers involved.  This will ensure that only the most 
qualified and competent planners are retained for these billets.   
 
- Coordination with the two branches responsible for promotions at HQMC, 
MMOA and MMEA (officers and enlisted) was conducted to ensure that 
qualified personnel were screened properly and promoted on time with 
peers.  There was also considerable discussion on the negative 
connotations that operational planning has carried with it.  These 
discussions were held with senior leadership, but several members of this 
team were in attendance to present findings and reinforce the need for 
change.   
 
- With the addition of the force structure and the current congressionally 
approved surge in the total Marine Corps from 177,000 to 202,000, the 
new operational planning MOS will be eligible for bonuses in accordance 
with Marine Corps regulations. 
 
- In coordination with occupational field sponsors and monitors for 
personnel moves, duty station preference will be given to each operational 
planner at the end of any successful tour completed.   
 
- One of the highlights of this particular item was the approval of the 
changes to the mission of operational planners.  Previously, planners were 
not involved in the execution of an exercise.  Beginning with the 
Afghanistan tour in December 2008, each operational planner that is on 
staff with a deploying unit or involved with exercise planning will be 
retained on with the operational unit and complete the exercise or 
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deployment.  This will also assist greatly in career progression and 
alleviate fears that operational planners never become operational.   
 
 
Financial Planning/CMO 
 
Solution:  CMO.  Given the recent events and changes to conventional warfare, 
there is considerable need for inclusion of CMO and financial planning during 
exercises and contingency operations.  The Marine Corps has taken the first step 
in the right direction in 2006 when they realigned force structure to include a civil 
affairs unit.  However, the majority of civil affairs Marines are reservists.  The 
same scenario exists in the Army, where only 4 % are active duty soldiers, with 
the remaining 96% of civil affairs units are reservists.  This creates a multitude of 
problems when discussing exercise planning, training and scenario based 
evolutions for active duty forces.  
 
The Marine Corps is implementing a force structure change that will open the 
door for more active duty forces, but it will still not be enough to have civil affairs 
units that the three MEF commands.  However, it will then be possible to attach 
them to operating units for exercises and include them in the planning process.  
During this project, representatives from the 3rd Civil Affairs Group were 
requested to attend the conferences and be involved in the exercises.  While 
they played a small role in Cobra Gold 08 and Talon Vision 09, their involvement 
was seen as a huge success and paved the way for future operations. 
 
Long term deployments present another obstacle in training, preparation and 
command relationships.  As the availability of trained civil affairs Marines 
increases, units will be based at each forward command and this problem will 
correct itself.  In the interim, civil affairs units train for their respective mission at 
their home base and meet their new command in theater.      
 
Financial:  With the amount of money that is currently involved in combat 
operations, trained personnel must be involved in all aspects of the mission.  
Contingency contracting plays a large role in any mission and is essential when 
dealing with the civilian populous in a war torn country.  Department of Defense 
and Marine Corps regulations are very specific on how cash in a deployed zone 
will be handled.  To date, the Marine Corps has been very fortunate to not have 
any incidents in moving large amounts of cash or the responsibility for it during 
operations.   
 
Civil affairs and financially trained Marines will be joined with contracting and 
comptroller (accounting) personnel into a joint contracting cell.  This cell will be 
responsible for all financial and CMO projects during a mission.  An example of 
how this cell will fit into the command structure is shown below in Figure 7.  
Talisman Saber 09 will be the first exercise to fully integrate the financial or 
comptroller cell into the planning process, as well as the execution.  It will also 
mark the first multi-national and joint service comptroller cell.   
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Figure 7:  Command Structure for Talisman Saber 09, including Comptroller Cell 
 
In addition, standard operating procedures will be established that will outline the 
duties of each member of the newly formed cell.  Command relationships will be 
developed so that each member is clear on their reporting chain during the 
operation.  Training will be conducted with all other Marines in preparation for 
any mission, with the addition of CMO and financial scenarios in the planning 
process and execution phases.   
 
 
Planning Conferences 
 
Solution:  The onus of planning conferences will fall to the command that is 
ultimately responsible for the exercise or contingency operation, known as the 
executive agency (EA).  Although this is not a change from past operations, there 
will be significant changes in the procedures that take place before, during and 
after conferences.  
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Prior to the conferences, the EA will designate two personnel that are direct 
representatives of the commanders themselves.  They will be appointed in 
writing and held accountable for their actions.  With the appointment, in 
accordance with regulations, they will also be pecuniary liable for all funds 
obligated and expensed for the particular exercise they are responsible for (this 
will only apply to exercises, not contingency operations).    
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The Office in Charge (OIC) of the conference will be responsible for all 
attendees, coordination of the conference, agenda, force protection and output.  
They alone hold the power to invite or remove any member from the conference 
at any time.  The assistant to the OIC will play a critical role in coordinating 
funding with the EA and cultivating relationships with the host government.   
 
The comptroller (accounting) sections of the EA have also been directed to 
ensure strict adherence to regulations when planning conferences are involved 
and not to increase authorizations unless specifically directed by the commander.  
Also, budgets for planning conferences will be cut in half during FY09.  Not only 
is this being done out of operational necessity, but the findings of the observation 
team indicated that the majority of the work being done at a planning conference 
either could have been done from the duty station or was being done from the 
duty station after the conference.  Many of the representatives were being sent to 
the conferences with no power or no knowledge to make decisions and had to 
return to their command before finalizing operational plans.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 35 ~ 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The current Marine Corps Planning Process is explained clearly, comes 
complete with examples, flows very well and basically looks great on paper.  The 
main issue with the planning process is that the Marine Corps has fallen into a 
rut.  While they have changed the face of the process and talked about 
systematic updates, the routine that plays out during planning looks eerily similar 
to what has been taking place over the last 40 years.  The world has changed, 
upgraded its technology and spawned a new breed of enemy and war.  The 
Marine Corps and the U.S. military must adapt to those changes or they will be 
out maneuvered and up against an enemy that uses their own tactics of strength 
vs. weakness against us. 
 
The 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, echoed these 
words in this year’s birthday message to all Marines.   
 
“Extremists have attacked our Nation, at home and abroad, numerous 
times…Their aim has always been the same ---- to kill as many innocent 
Americans as possible.  The attacks of 11 September 2001 changed our Nation 
forever, and our President has resolved that this Nation will not stand idle while 
murderous terrorists plan their next strike.  The Marines will continue to take the 
fight to the enemy ---- hitting them on their own turf, crushing them when they 
show themselves, and finding them where they hide.   
 
Only a few Americans choose the dangerous, but necessary, work of fighting our 
Nation’s enemies.  When our chapter of history is written, it will be a saga of a 
selfless generation of Marines who were willing to stand up and fight for our 
Nation; to defend those who could not defend themselves; to thrive on the 
hardship and sacrifice expected of an elite warrior class; and to ably shoulder the 
legacy of those Marines who have gone before.” (Conway, Nov. 2008) 
 
As discussed previously, the planning process is an effective way for 
commanders and staff to develop COAs and communicate the commander’s 
intent to the forces and elements that will execute the mission.  What has 
become the status quo is that while the planning is invaluable for the 
commander, the operational order is not in line with the current situation.  Ground 
commanders are then forced to operate based on commander’s intent alone.  
While the Marine Corps has been very adept at surviving and even thriving in this 
type of scenario, there are structural defects in our planning process that can be 
changed for the benefit of all involved.  It would also provide the ground 
commander with a better product to aid him in decision making during 
operations. 
 
The end result is that this project successfully evaluated the current planning 
process, developed solutions and is in the process of implementing them.  The 
project will officially be closed at the completion of the Talisman Saber 09 
exercise in July of 2009.  At that time, all command levels will be operating with 
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the same guidance from HQMC concerning changes made to the planning 
process.  They will also benefit from an improved planning process that utilizes 
qualified and trained personnel to produce a quality product for ground 
commanders and Marines.  The ability to have planners participate in the 
missions they plan is critical in developing long term standards and up to date 
planning methods.   
 
The translation of effective planning to the Marines on the ground engaged in 
battle against our Nation’s foes is well worth the efforts expended during this 
project.  If there is one thing that has been consistent on the battlefield over the 
past few decades, it is that there is constant change.  Change has been evident 
in technology, communications, tactics, armor and weaponry… virtually all 
aspects of the military.   Change has now made its way through the Marine 
Corps planning process and the Marine Corps will be much better for it.  
Throughout all the change surrounding the military and the modern face of 
warfare, there is one thing that has not changed…the expectations of the United 
States Marine Corps.       
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SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
There are multiple areas available for further research.  From the Marine Corps 
perspective, the planning process must adapt to changes on the modern 
battlefield deriving from technology, tactics and enemy operations.  This will 
require constant vigilance and review of procedures and processes.  Currently, 
the Marine Corps has agreed to a review board every two years beginning in 
FY2012, for this purpose. Other areas for further research include: 
 
- MPS: Maritime Prepositioning Ships.  This unique system is the impetus 
behind the military’s ability to project power from the sea to any country in 
the world in less than 48 hours.  These ships are loaded with all military 
gear required for a contingency operation and are prepositioned around 
the world in anticipation of potential hot spots for military deployments.  
While this process was cursorily reviewed during this project, the surface 
was barely scratched and the implications of a more efficient process 
would pay dividends to all branches of military service. 
 
- Manpower and Structure:  Given the current state of the world and the 
operational tempo of all military services, manpower is a grave concern.  
The impacts of the political administration could also be a factor in 
defense spending and the related trickle-down effect to the branches of 
service and its members.         
 
- Marine Corps Engineers:  Identified during this project, but not reported 
due to its classification, was the fact that the engineering MOS is over 
tasked and its technologies are not on par with current trends.  This is an 
area that has hampered deployments to remote regions and created 
communications issues in the early stages of force maneuvers.  Several 
side projects could be researched and potentially deemed unclassified.   
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